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Abstract

system from “unobservable false data injection
attacks”, which are created by manipulating multiple
measurements simultaneously while keeping all the
measurement residuals within normal range. These
detection methods use measurements obtained from a
single time instant and deal with false data injection
attacks for supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems. References [13]-[14] study false
data injection attacks using synchrophasor
measurements obtained from multiple time instants,
and perform detections according to the spatiotemporal correlations among these measurements.
However, expensive computations such as nonlinear
optimizations are involved in [13], which may limit
the real-time applicability of the algorithm. Prior
knowledge on system parameters and topology is
required in [14], which may introduce detection
errors if inaccurate system information is presented.

This paper presents an online data-driven
algorithm to detect false data injection attacks
towards synchronphasor measurements. The
proposed algorithm applies density-based local
outlier factor (LOF) analysis to detect the anomalies
among the data, which can be described as spatiotemporal outliers among all the synchrophasor
measurements from the grid. By leveraging the
spatio-temporal correlations among multiple time
instants of synchrophasor measurements, this
approach could detect false data injection attacks
which are otherwise not detectable using
measurements obtained from single snapshot. This
algorithm requires no prior knowledge on system
parameters or topology. The computational speed
shows satisfactory potential for online monitoring
applications. Case studies on both synthetic and realworld synchrophasor data verify the effectiveness of
the proposed algorithm.

1. Introduction
The electric power system is evolving towards
tighter coupling between the information and
physical systems [1]-[4]. As a prime example of
sensor
and
communication
deployment,
synchrophasors
provide
high-resolution
measurements with GPS-synchronized time stamps,
which could benefit system monitoring, control, and
protection. However, the communication and sensory
system for synchrophasors also gives rise to threats
of cyber attacks, which is of increasing concern for
the grid operators [5]-[10].
As a first step towards preventing the
synchrophasor system from possible cyber attacks,
several algorithms for better monitoring have been
introduced.
References
[11]-[12]
propose
methodologies to identify and protect key
measurements in a power grid, in order to prevent the
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In this paper, a purely data-driven approach is
proposed for online detection of false data injection
attacks for synchrophsor measurements. An online
attack detection framework is proposed to detect false
synchrophasor data that is temporarily injected into a
limited number of synchrophasors in certain power
system. The proposed approach leverages the spatiotemporal correlations among multi-time-instant
synchrophasor measurements, and detects local
outliers using a density-based data-mining technique.
This approach is shown to be capable of detecting
false data injection attacks in synchrophasor systems
under both normal and eventful operating conditions,
without introducing false alarms when system
physical disturbances are presented. It requires no
prior knowledge of system parameters or topology,
and has fast computational speed suitable for online
applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides problem formulation for the falsedata-injection-attack detection of synchrophasor
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measurements; Section III proposes the online falsedata-injection-attack
detection
approach
for
synchrophasor systems; Section IV verifies the
proposed approach through case studies; Section V
presents concluding remarks to this paper.

2. Problem Formulation
In this section, the detection of false data injection
attacks for synchrophasor measurements is
formulated as detection of spatio-temporal outliers
among time series measured by synchrophasors
installed at various locations in the same power
network.

2.1. False Data Injection Attacks
Let m  n matrix M denote a set of
synchrophasor measurements collected from n
synchrophasor channels of the same type (i.e. all of
them are voltage/current/power channels), within m
time instants. This measurement matrix can be
decomposed into the following two matrices:

M  LD

(1)

where L denotes the matrix whose columns
represent true synchrophasor measurements without
false data injections attacks, and D denotes the
matrix of false data injections created by attackers.
Each nonzero entry Dij represents an injected data
point to the j th synchrophasor channel at time instant
i.
Definition 1: Let mi , li , and d i denote the i th
row of matrices M , L , and D , respectively. d i
represents the vector of coordinated false data
injections at time instant i , and mi represents the
vector of attacked synchrophasor measurements at
time instant i . The coordinated attack d i is defined
to be successful (undetectable) if the following
conditions are satisfied:

miT  h( xi )  ri

(2)

f (ri )  

(3)

where xi denotes the system state variables
estimated by certain state estimation algorithm at
time instant i ; h() denotes the nonlinear
relationship between system states and measurements
(i.e., the power flow equations); ri denotes the

measurement residuals at time instant i ; f ()
denotes the bad data detection criterion based on
measurement residuals;  denotes the threshold for
bad data detection. The detection criterion shown in
(3) is determined by the bad data detection
mechanism used in certain state estimation program.
Specifically, the  2 -test and largest normalized
residual test can be applied on ri to build (3) and
identify bad data.
In the above definition, the detection mechanism
takes advantages of the following information: 1)
system measurements obtained from single time
instant; 2) power flow relationship among system
measurements. Therefore, a coordinated attack d i
can go undetectable if power flow relationship h() is
satisfied without gross error, for the given
measurement set miT at single time instant i . In the
following section, a different detection mechanism is
proposed to deal with false data injection attacks. The
proposed mechanism leverages the following
information to detect false data injection attack: 1)
system synchrophasor measurements obtained from
multiple time instants; 2) spatio-temporal correlations
among system synchrophasor measurements. By
utilizing the above different set of information, the
proposed approach is able to detect false data
injection attacks which are undetectable when
traditional detection mechanism is applied.

2.2.
Features
of
Synchrophasor
Measurements with/without False Data
Injection Attacks
In order to analyze measurements obtained at
multiple time instants, row vectors mi , li , and d i are
inserted back into matrices M , L , and D ,
respectively. Each column of M represents a
measurement curve obtained at a synchrophasor
channel, whose i th entry could be attacked. In this
paper, we focus on the false data injection attacks
that could temporarily affect a limited number of
synchrophasors. This indicates the attack matrix D
is a sparse matrix with only a few nonzero entries.
It has been demonstrated in [13]-[16] that under
both normal and eventful operating conditions,
matrix L has the property of low rank, indicating
strong linear correlations among attack-free
synchrophasor measurements. However, matrix M
is shown to have a higher rank compared to L , due
to the nonzero entries of matrix D . Since rank of a
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matrix represents the number of linearly independent
columns/rows in the matrix, it can be concluded that
the number of linearly independent synchrophasor
measurements is increased due to the presence of
false data injection attacks. This indicates
synchrophasor curves under attacks tend to have
weaker (linear) correlations among each other,
compared with synchrophasor curves without attacks.

by the attackers, only the attacked synchrophasors in
the system would encounter a temporary change in
their measurements, while measurements obtained by
the other synchrophasors would reflect normal
system dynamics. Unlike system events which could
affect most of the synchrophaor measurements within
a local area, these false data injection attacks affect
only a small fraction of all the synchrophasor
measurements.
Therefore,
synchrophasor
measurements under this type of attack would have
outlier behavior compared with their spatial
neighborhoods which are free of attack.
The
above
features
of
synchrophasors
with/without false data injection attacks can be
summarized as follows:

Figure 1. Comparison between synchrophasor with
and without false data injection attack.
In order to further explain the above property,
Figure 1 shows voltage magnitude curves obtained at
two synchrophasors within the same local area. The
system is under eventful condition from 3s to 5s. The
upper curve contains a false data injection attack at
around 1s, while the lower curve is free of false data
injection attack. It can be observed that: 1) the upper
curve tends to have outlier behavior (weak temporal
correlation) when false data injection attack is
presented (around 1s) and when system event is
presented (from 3s to 5s); 2) during the attack-free
time period (from 2s to 10s), the two curves obtained
at different physical locations tend to have similar
behavior (strong spatial correlation), no matter when
the system is under normal or eventful operating
condition; 3) when the system is under attack (around
1s), the upper curve tends to have outlier behavior
(weak spatial correlation) compared with the lower
curve. The above phenomena is caused by the lowrank property of the attack-free measurement matrix
L and the sparse property of the attack matrix D .
Since components in the same power grid are
strongly coupled with each other through
transmission network, the system dynamic
measurements obtained by different synchrophasors
within a local area tend to be strongly correlated with
similar behavior, under both normal and eventful
operating conditions. However, when a limited
number of synchrophasors are temporarily attacked

Feature 1: Under normal operating conditions,
synchrophasor measurements without false data
injection attacks obtained from nearby physical
locations exhibit strong spatial and temporal
correlations with each other.
Feature 2: Under eventful operating conditions,
synchrophasor measurements without false data
injection attacks obtained from nearby physical
locations exhibit strong spatial correlations but weak
temporal correlations with each other.
Feature 3: Under both normal and eventful operating
conditions, synchrophasor measurements with false
data injection attacks exhibit weak spatial and
temporal
correlations
with
synchrophasor
measurements without false data injection attacks.
The above three features are further demonstrated
through the simple example shown in Figure 2. Three
2×8 measurement matrices M(1), M(2), and M(3) are
sampled from the same set of synchrophasor channels
at three different time periods. Each matrix contains 8
synchrophasor curves within 2 consecutive time
instants. M(1) contains 6 attack-free synchrophasor
curves and 2 attacked synchrophasor curves obtained
under normal operating condition. M(2) and M(3)
contain 8 attack-free synchrophasor curves obtained
under eventful and normal operating conditions,
respectively. The Euclidean distance is used to
quantify the strength of the spatio-temporal
correlations among these curves. Each synchrophasor
curve in the three matrices is projected to the 2D
Euclidean space shown in Figure 2. The x and y
coordinates of each point are the data values at the
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first and second time instant of the corresponding
synchrophasor curve, respectively.

false-data-injection-attack detection problem are
presented as follows:
Step 1: Define a proper distance function to quantify
the similarity between ith and jth column of M.
Step 2: Map each column of M to the subspace S
where the distance function is defined. Each column
of M can be represented as a point in the
corresponding subspace S.

Figure 2. 2D points representing synchrophasor
curves under normal/eventful/attacked conditions.
The following observations can be drawn from
Figure 2: (1) the cluster of eventful synchrophasor
data (eventful cluster) lies far from the clusters of
attack-free synchrophasor data under normal
operating condition (normal cluster), indicating weak
temporal correlation between the two clusters; (2) all
the points within the eventful cluster lie close to each
other, indicating strong spatial correlation among
points within the eventful cluster; (3) the two points
representing attacked synchrophasor curves lie far
from the normal cluster, as well as the majority of
points in the other 6 points representing the 6 attackfree synchrophasor curves in M(1), indicating weak
spatial and temporal similarities with those
neighboring points. Therefore, synchrophasor
measurements under false data injection attacks show
the feature of weak spatio-temporal correlations with
their neighboring measurements.

2.3. Detection of Spatio-temporal Outliers due
to False Data Injection Attacks
The
above
features
of
synchrophasor
measurements with/without false data injection
attacks indicate that under both normal and eventful
operating conditions, synchrophasor measurements
with false data injection attacks can be considered as
spatio-temporal outliers among all the synchrophasor
measurements of the same type. These outliers can be
detected using density-based outlier detection
methods, if the strength of spatio-temporal
correlations among synchrophasor measurements can
be measured properly by certain definition of
“distance”.
For a measurement matrix M obtained within a
certain period of time, general steps to formulate the

Step 3: Examine the outlier behavior of the points in
the subspace S, according to the distance function
defined in Step 1. Points lying far from the majority
are classified as data with false data injection attacks.
In the above formulation, a data segment that can be
identified as “spatio-temporal” outlier among its
neiboring data segments has the the following
characteristics: it shows certain outlying behavior
(quantified by the definition of “distance”) along both
row direction and column direction of the
measurement matrix M.

3. Online Detection of False Data
Injection Attacks
In this section, a local outlier factor (LOF) based
approach is proposed for online detection of false
data injection attacks towards synchrophasor
measurements. In [17], we present a similar LOFbased approach for data quality improvement of
synchrophasor systems. In this paper, we focus on the
false data injection attack detection problem for
synchrophasor measurements, and propose a more
robust definition of “distance”, which is tailored for
detecting false data injection attacks caused by false
data injections in synchrophasor systems. The
proposed
LOF-based
false-data-injection-attack
detection algorithm is described as follows.

3.1. Definition of “Distance”
Synchrophasor Measurements

between

In order to measure the strength of spatiotemporal
correlations
among
synchrophasor
measurements, the following definition of “distance”
is proposed.
Definition 2: Let M (k ) denote the measurement
matrix obtained at the k th time interval. Let M i (k )
and M j (k ) denote the i th and j th columns of
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measurement matrix M (k ) , that is, M i (k ) and
M j (k ) are synchrophasor measurements obtained
from the i th and j th synchrophasor channels at the
same time interval. The distance d (i, j ) between
M i (k ) and M j (k ) is defined as follows:

d (i, j )   iNorm   Norm
j

 iNorm 

 i (k )

t  k 1

  (t ) 
i

C ( M i (t ))

t 1

1
C ( M i (t ))  
0

(4)

(5)

t  k 1



C ( M i (t ))

t 1

( M i (t )  C )
( M i (t )  C )

(6)

where  i (t ) denotes the standard deviation of the
columns of M i (t ) , C denotes the data set of all the
synchrophasor measurements identified to be clean
(without false data injection attacks) by the proposed
algorithm.
Intuitively,  iNorm represents the standard
deviation of measurements obtained from the i th
synchrophasor channel at current time interval k ,
normalized by the average of all the standard
deviations of measurements obtained from the same
channel at previous time intervals, when this channel
is identified to be clean. This normalized standard
deviation  iNorm serves as an indicator of the strength
of dynamic behavior of time series M i (t ) . For clean
measurements without false data injection attacks,
their normalized standard deviations tend to have
similar values, indicating strong spatio-temporal
correlations among them. However, the normalized
standard deviations of attacked measurements tend to
have significantly different values compared with
those of clean measurements, due to their weak
spatio-temporal correlations. Therefore, the distance
d (i, j ) can be defined as the absolute difference
between  iNorm and  Norm
. Larger distance indicates
j
weaker spatio-temporal correlations between M i (k )
and M j (k ) .

3.2. LOFs Computation
Based on the above definition of distance, LOFs
for synchrophasor measurements can be calculated
through the following procedure. Details of the LOF
analysis can be found in reference [18].

3.2.1. Calculation of k-distance(p). Let the
measurement matrix M be the matrix consisting of
synchrophasor measurements, each row of M
represents a time instant, and each column of M
represents
measurements
obtained
from a
synchrophasor channel. Let p , q , o be some
objects in M , each object represents a column in
M . Let k be a positive integer. Let q  M \{ p}
denotes {q : q  M , q { p}} . The distance between p
and q , denoted by d ( p, q) , is defined in the previous
section.
For any positive integer k , the k-distance of
object p , denoted by k-distance(p), is defined as the
distance d ( p, o) between p and an object o  M
such that:
a) for at least k objects o  M \{ p} it holds that
d ( p, o)  d ( p, o) , and
b) for at most k  1 objects o  M \{ p} it holds that
d ( p, o)  d ( p, o) .
where
The value of k-distance(p) provides a measure on the
density around the object p . Smaller k-distance(p)
indicates higher density around p .
3.2.2. Identification of k-distance neighborhood of
p. Given k-distance(p), the k-distance neighborhood of
p contains every object whose distance from p is not
greater than the k-distance, i.e.,
Nk distance( p) ( p) 
{q  M \{ p}| d ( p, q)  k  distance( p)}

These objects
neighbors of p.

q

(7)

are called the k-nearest

3.2.3. Calculation of reachability distance of object
p with respect to object o. The reachability distance
of object p with respect to object o is defined as:

reach  distk ( p, o) 
max{k  distance(o), d ( p, o)}

(8)

Intuitively, if object p is far away from object o ,
then the reachability distance between p and o is
simply their actual distance. However, if they are
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‘sufficiently’ close to each other, the actual distance
is replaced by the k-distance of o . The reason is that
in doing so, the statistical fluctuations of d ( p, o) for
all the p 's close to o can be significantly reduced.
The strength of this smoothing effect can be
controlled by the parameter k . The higher the value
of k , the more similar the reachability distances for
objects within the same neighborhood.

historical data obtained from the same system.
Synchrophasor channels with LOFs exceeding the
threshold can be detected as attacked channels.
Figure 2 shows the implementation flowchart for the
proposed
LOF-based
false-data-injection-attack
detection approach.

3.2.4. Calculation of local reachability density of p.
The local reachability density of p is defined as:

lrd MinPts ( p ) 




reach  distMinPts ( p, o) 
 oN

MinPts ( p )


| N MinPts ( p) |







1

(9)

where Nk ( p)  Nk distance( p) ( p) .
Intuitively, the local reachability density of an object
p is the inverse of the average reachability distance
based on the MinPts-nearest neighbors of p. It is
essentially an estimation of the density at point p by
analyzing the k-distance of the objects in N k ( p) .
The local reachability density of p is just the
reciprocal of the average distance between p and the
objects in its k-neighborhood.
3.2.4. Calculation of LOF of p. The local outlier
factor of p is defined as:



LOFMinPts ( p) 

oN MinPts

lrd MinPts (o)
lrd MinPts ( p)
( p)

| N MinPts ( p) |

(10)

The local outlier factor of object p captures the
degree to which p is a local outlier. It is the average
of the ratio of the local reachability density of p and
those of p 's MinPts-nearest neighbors. It is easy to
see that the lower p 's local reachability density is,
and the higher the local reachability densities of p 's
MinPts-nearest neighbors are, the higher the LOF
value of p is.
After obtaining LOFs for all the synchrophasor
channels, each LOF is compared with a pre-defined
threshold to detect false data injection attacks. The
LOF threshold is a system-dependent value and can
be determined through offline training, using

Figure 3. Flowchart of the proposed false-datainjection-attack detection approach.

4. Case Studies
In this section, the proposed false-data-injectionattack detection approach is tested using both
synthetic and practical synchrophasor data. In order
to demonstrate the proposed approach can detect
false data injection attack under eventful operating
condition, without introducing false alarms by system
physical events, a system event is presented in each
of the test cases. In all the following test cases, a
unique set of algorithm parameters are used: moving
data window length = 20 data points; LOF threshold
= 10; Number of neighboring data for LOF algorithm
= 0.5  number of synchrophasor curves. The setting
of the algorithm parameters can be optimized through
offline training using historical synchrophasor
measurements obtained in the same power grid.
It is worth emphasizing that, the physical events
chosen for the following case studies are fast
transient events with similar temporal outlying
behavior compared to the false data injection attacks.
Both the events and the attacks show some sudden
changes in the eventful/attacked synchrophasor
curve. This similarity could potentially cause false
alarms for false-data-attack detection algorithms. For
slower events such as variation of loading conditions,
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less false alarms would be introduced, since these
slow events do not have very similar temporal
outlying behavior compared to false data injection
attacks.

4.1. Case Study with Synthetic Data
The synthetic synchrophasor measurements are
generated using simulation results obtained from a
standard IEEE-14 bus system in Matlab PSAT
toolbox [19]. In order to verify the performance of
the proposed algorithm under eventful operating
condition, a three-phase line-to-ground fault is
applied to the system. All the simulation results are
sampled at the rate of 50Hz to build the synthetic
synchrophasor data. The synthetic data set has 14
synchrophasor curves for voltage magnitudes, where
synchrophasor channels No. 1, 3, and 9 contain
constant false data injections (lasting from 6s to 6.4s)
[13]-[14]. The length of each injected data segment is
0.4s. Figure 3 shows the data curves with false data
injection attacks.

Figure 5. LOF values of synthetic synchrophasor
channels when system physical event (right) or false
data injection attack (left) is presented.
The detection results of false data injection
attacks for synthetic synchrophasor data are shown in
Table 1. It can be seen that all the attacked
synchrophasor channels (No. 1, 3, and 9) are
successfully detected, and no false alarms are created
by system events. The time delay of the starting and
ending time instants of the false data injection attacks
is less than 0.38s. The time delay is mainly caused by
the time window length determined in the algorithm.
Larger time window may result in more time delay
for the detection. The average computation time for
the proposed algorithm over one time window is
0.0130s. The detection delay and computation time of
the proposed approach are insignificant compared
with the latency requirements for online quasisteady-state applications, ranging from 1 seconds to 5
seconds [20]. The performance of the proposed
approach is satisfactory for online applications.
Table 1. Detection results for synthetic
synchrophasor data with false data injection attack

Figure 4. Synthetic synchrophasor measurements
with false data injection attacks.
Figure 4 shows the LOF values of the
synchrophasor measurements under physical event or
false data injection attack. It can be seen that under
physical events, LOFs of all the measurements lie far
below the threshold value, while under false data
injection attacks, LOFs of the attacked measurements
(synchrophasor channel No. 1, 3, and 9) exceed the
threshold value. This verifies the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm in accurately detecting false data
injection attacks without creating false alarms due to
physical system events.

Index of
Synchrophasor
with Cyber
Attack
1
3
9

Starting Time
of Attacked
Segment

Ending Time of
Attacked
Segment

6.20s
(LOF = 101.5)
6.32s
(LOF = 52.3)
6.32s
(LOF = 73.9)

6.78s
(LOF = 33.4)
6.78s
(LOF = 26.3)
6.78s
(LOF = 36.6)

4.2. Case Study with Actual PMU Data
The proposed approach is also tested using real
synchrophasor measurements obtained in a practical
power grid during a line-tripping fault. The sampling
rate of the synchrophasor data is 100Hz. Since we do
not have access to some cyber compromised actual
PMU data, in order to test the performance under
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false data injection attacks, we added constant data
injections to PMU No. 14, 18, 24, and 37 (lasting
from 1.0s to 1.2s). The length of each injected data
segment is 0.2s. Figure 5 shows the data curves with
false data injection attacks.

Figure 6. Practical synchrophasor measurements with
false data injection attacks.
Figure 6 shows the LOF values of the
synchrophasor measurements under physical event
and false data injection attack. It can be seen that
under physical events, LOFs of all the measurements
lie far below the threshold value, while under false
data injection attacks, LOFs of the attacked
measurements (synchrophasor channel No. 14, 18,
24, and 37) exceed the threshold value. This verifies
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in
accurately detecting false data injection attacks
without creating false alarms due to physical system
events.

0.19s. The time delay is mainly caused by the time
window length determined in the algorithm. Larger
time window may result in more time delay for the
detection. The average computation time for the
proposed algorithm over one time window is 0.040s.
The detection delay and computation time of the
proposed approach are insignificant compared with
the latency requirements for online quasi-steady-state
applications, ranging from 1 seconds to 5 seconds
[20]. The performance of the proposed approach is
satisfactory for online applications. Although the
computation time of the proposed algorithm would
grow if more synchrophasor curves are available in
the system, the growth in computation time would be
limited since there is no complicated computation,
such as nonlinear optimization or matrix inversion,
involved in the proposed approach. Moreover, in
order to detect false data injection attacks in largescale power systems with a large number of
synchrophasors, this approach can be easily applied
in a decentralized way by performing false-datainjection-attack detection at each of the local phasor
data concentrators (PDC), using synchrophasor data
obtained at the corresponding local regions.
Table 2. Detection results for practical synchrophasor
data with false data injection attack
Index of
Synchrophasor
with Cyber
Attack
14
18
24
37

Figure 7. LOF values of practical synchrophasor
channels when system physical event (right) or false
data injection attack (left) is presented.
The detection results of false data injection attacks
for practical synchrophasor data are shown in Table
2. It can be seen that all the attacked synchrophasor
channels (No. 14, 18, 24, and 37) are successfully
detected, and no false alarms are created by system
events. The time delay of the starting and ending time
instants of the false data injection attacks is less than

Starting Time
of Attacked
Segment

Ending Time of
Attacked
Segment

1.16s
(LOF = 141.9)
1.16s
(LOF = 99.5)
1.16s
(LOF = 60.4)
1.16s
(LOF = 332.2)

1.39s
(LOF = 133.4)
1.39s
(LOF = 93.6)
1.39s
(LOF = 55.9)
1.39s
(LOF = 311.8)

In order to study the impact of time delay on the
performance of the proposed algorithm, Figure 7
shows the receiver operator characteristic (ROC)
curves when different time window lengths are used.
It can be seen from Figure 7 that: a) the proposed
approach has higher detection accuracy when the
time window length is set to be 0.2s or 0.25s; b)
when the time window length is set at a lower value
(0.15s), the detection accuracy tends to be lower and
false alarms would happen; c) when the time window
length is increased form 0.2s to 0.25s, the detection
accuracy of the proposed algorithm is not improved
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significantly. Since time window length is also
closely related to the detection delay of the algorithm,
it is desirable to consider both detection accuracy and
detection delay when determining the time window
length for the algorithm.

SCADA and synchrophasors) would offer new
possibilities to detect such coordinated attacks. We
would also investigate more robust definitions of
distances for various types of data attacks. Last but
not least, we would also investigate different
categories of cyber attacks such as spoofing of GPS
clocks.
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